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BARGAINING THEORY FOR GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE VALUE 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an existence proof of a bargaining 
equilibrium set B., in the case of games with transferable value, by 
making use of the Knaster Kuratowski Mazurkiewicz (KKM) Theorem. As a
corollary proof of existence of the usual bargaining set B1 is
obtained. Whereas previous proofs of B1 existence have made use of
fixed point arguments, use of the KKM theorem provides an insight into 
possible extensions of the existence proof to the nontransferable 
value case. 
BARGAINING THEORY FOR GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE VALUE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Norman Schofield 
California Institute of Technology 
The standard proof of nonemptiness of the bargaining set 
B1(M), for a coalition M in a voting game with transferable value,
makes use of a fixed point argument (Peleg, 1967b). In this paper a 
proof of nonemptiness of B1(M) is obtained by showing the nonemptiness
of two subsets of B1(M), namely the kernel, K(M), and a new bargaining
set B*(M). 
Moreover the method of proof presented here uses the Knaster, 
Kuratowski, Mazurkiewicz (KKM) Theorem (1929) rather than a fixed
point argument. This theorem gives sufficient conditions for the 
nonemptiness of the intersection of a finite family of subsets of a 
simplex. In the situation examined here, the sets under consideration 
are equilibrium sets, associated with the members of a coalition, M, 
in the pareto set V(M) for the coalition. 
Since the KKM theorem can be generalized to the case of a 
family of subsets of an arbitrary compact convex subset of a 
topological vector space (see Fan, 1961, and Schofield, 1983b for 
discussion) this suggests that the proof procedure presented here can 
be extended to obtain existence theorems for equilibrium bargaining 
sets in the more general case of general characteristic function games 
without transferable value. 
2. THE BARGAINING SETS AND KERNEL
Here we give a brief formal definition of the bargaining set 
and kernel. 
A game with transferable value (t.v.) for a society 
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N {l, • • •  , n} is a function v : 2N � lR where 2N is the power set of
N (i.e., the class of all subsets, or coalitions, of N). 
The number, v(M), is the value associated with coalition M. 
We assume for any individual i in N that v({i}) L o. 
Of particular interest is a simple t.v. game defined in terms 
of a class, ID , of winning coalitions, such that
v(M) > 0 iff M e ID 
and 
v(M) 0 iff M i ID • 
A simple weighted majority game (with t.v.) is a simple t.v. 
game where winning coalitions are defined in the following way. Each 
player {1, • • •  , n} is assigned a weight w(i). The weight of coalition M 
is w(M) = } w(i). A number q, with q > 1/2 w(N), is specified such 1eM 
that M e ID iff w(M) L q. In such a game we also assume v(M) = 1
wherever M e ID. A simple weighted majority game is often written
[q : q(l). • • •  , w(n)J. 
A simple q-majority game is a simple weighted majority game where each 
player has weight 1. Thus the game may be written [q 1, • • •  , 1] .  A 
simple majority game is a simple q-majority game with q being the 
smallest integer which is strictly greater than n/2. 
For a general transferable value game, v, and coalition M let 
V(M) be the subset of JRn defined as follows:
x E V(M) iff (i) xj = O for all j i M. 
(ii) xi l O for all i e M. 
(iii) �xi = v(M).
l.E 
A payoff configuration (p. c. ) is a pair (x, M) where M is a coalition 
and x = C x1, . . .  , xn) belongs to v(M).
One payoff configuration (y, C) dominates another (x, M) iff 
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Yi > xi for each i e C. In this case write (y, C)dom(x, M). The core is
the set of payoff configurations which are undominated. For a typical 
(proper simple) voting game the core will be empty. See Schofield 
(1980) for a general argument to this effect, which is applicable to 
both the transferable and nontransferable cases. However; the core 
will be nonempty if there exists a veto player; a veto player is a 
player (or party) that belongs to every winning coalition. When the 
core is empty, every payoff configuration will be unstable (i. e. , 
dominated by another). We therefore look for a solution theory to 
select those payoff configurations that might be "less unstable" in 
some sense. 
Consider a p. c. , (x, M), dominated by another, (y, C). The 
latter may be considered a "threat" by any player i in C n M to a
player j in M\C. On the other hand suppose that there exists a p. c. , 
(x,D), dominating (y, C), where j e D, such that z. l x . •  Then theJ J 
threat by i to j may be countered by j without loss. 
We make this more formal. 
If L, J are two subsets of N, let TLJ be the family of
supersets of L which do not intersect J. Thus 
TLJ {Ac N L c A and J n A = <Pl 
Definition 1 
Let (x, M) be a p. c. and L, J two disjoint subsets of the 
coalition M. 
(a) An objection by L against J >'ith respect to (x, M) is a p. c. , 
(y, C) such that 
(i) C e TLJ 
(ii) Yi > xi for all i e L
(iii) Yi l xi for all i e C.
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(b) A counter objection by J against L's objection, (y,C), is a p. c. , 
(x, D), such that 
(i) D e TJL
(ii) zj l xj for all j e J
(iii) z j l y j for all j e D • 
(c) An objection (y, C) by L again J is said to be justified if there 
is no counter objection by J to (y, C). If L has a justified 
objection against J with respect to the p. c. , (x, M), then write 
LP(x)J. 
s 
Definition 2 
(a) A p. c. , (x, M), is called B1-stable if to any objection by an
individual i against and individual j e M\{i}, there is a counter
objection by j. Let B1(M) be the set of B1-stable payoff vectors
for M, and call B1(M) the B1-bargaining set for M. Thus
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Clearly a B2 counter objection will be more difficult to effect than a
B1 counter objection.
We now introduce a third solution notion, the kernel which 
belongs to B1(M).
B1(M) = {x e V(M) : (x, M) is B1-stable} Definition 3 
(b) A p. c. , (x, M), is called B2-stable if to any objection by an
individual i against any subgroup Jc M\{i}, there is a counter
objection by J. Let B2(M) be the set of B2-stable payoff vector
for M. Thus B2(M) = {x e V(M) : (x,M) is B2-stable}.
Suppose we write iP2(x)j when individual i has a justified
objection against a subgroup J c M\{i} which contains j. Clearly
iP(x)j implies that iP2(x)j.
Moreover, 
B1 (M) {x e V(M) iP(x)j for no i, j e M}
and 
B2(M) = {x e V(M) iP2Cx)j for no i, j e M}
and so B2(M) c B1(M).
Note that if i objects with (y, C) then this may be regarded as 
an objection against the subgroup M\C. For B1-stability each 
individual j in M\C must be able to counter object by (z(j),D(j)), 
say. For B2-stability the whole group M\C must be able to form a
counter objection (z, D) such that M\C c D and zj 2 xj for all j e M\C.
Let V 2N -7 JR be a transferable value game.
(i) Let (x, M) be a p. c. For any other coalition C, define the 
� of C over M at x to be
where 
ex(C) = v(C) - x(C) 
x(C) = I xi.i eC 
(This excess is the amount the members of C stand to gain 
over their current payoff if they can form this coalition. ) 
Suppose now that i, j are two players in the coalition M. 
(ii) Define the surplus of i over j at x e V(M) to be
Sij(x) = m� {ex(C) : C e  Tij}. Thus i's surplus over j is
the maximum excess of i over x. across all coalitions that 
include i but exclude j. 
(iii) Say that i outweighs j (with respect to (x, M)) iff 
(i) x j > 0 
(ii) sij(x) > sji(x),
and in this case write iQ(x)j. 
(iv) Say the p. c. , (x, M) is K-stable if for no i, j & M is it the
case that iQ(x)j. Then the kernel, K(M), for M is the set 
K(M) = {x e V(M) : (x, M) is K-stable} . 
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The above definitions can be made more general by referring to 
a coalition structure, S. A coalition structure (cs), S, is a 
disjoint partition CM1, ... , Mr) of N. A payoff configuration (x, S) is 
a pair (x, S) where S is a coalition structure and for each M in S, 
f xi= v(M). A p. c. (x, S) belongs to the Bargaining Set B1(S) iff 1eM 
for each M in S it is the case that (x,M) belongs to B1(M), in the
sense of definition 1. All definitions and proofs of existence for 
B1(M) and K(M), etc., extend to the bargaining set and kernel B1(S)
and K(S) for coalition structures. 
For notational convenience we shall only work with B1(M) and
K(M) etc. 
3. PROPERTIES OF THE BARGAINING SETS
In this section we examine the properties of K(M), B1(M) and
B2(M) and introduce a new bargaining set B*(M). First of all we show,
for a game with transferable value, that the kernel for a coalition 
belongs to the B1-bargaining set of that coalition.
Lemma 1 (a generalization of Davis and Maschler, 1967 , lemma 3.1). 
Let v be a game with transferable value. Let M be a coalition, and 
(x, M) a p.c. Let L, J be two disjoint subsets of M. If L has an 
objection (y, C) against J w.r. t. (x, M) and there is some coalition 
D e  TJL such that ex(D) l ex(C), then J has a counter objection
against L's objection, (y,C). 
Proof: Since (y, C) is an objection, 
e(C) = v(C) - x(C) 
= v(C) - y(C) + � (yi - xi) > O • .
Define the counter objection (z, D) by 
zi = xi for i e D - C - J
zi = yi for i e D n C
Consider {zi : i e J} such that
Therefore 
Now 
Hence 
Thus 
� zi v(D) - [ {zj j e D - J} .
f (z. - x.) = v(D) - f y. - f x .  - f x . •';r i i J:it: i D-1:'-J J ';r i 
kyj v(C) - f yi � v(C) - f x . •d=n d=n J 
� (zi - xi) l v(D) - v(C) + bn xi - f-.cxi.
f (z. - x.) l [v(D) - f x. - f x.] ';r i i r5=c i rit: i 
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- [v(C) - �xi - �xi] 
= 
ex(D) - ex(C). 
If ex(D) 2 ex(C) then it is possible to find a p.c. (z, D) such that 
zi 2 xi for each i e J. Thus J has a counter objection against (y, C). 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2: Let v be a game with transferable value, and let M be a 
coalition. Then K(M) is a subset of B1(M). 
Proof: Clearly if M i ID, so v(M) = 0 then K(M) = B1 (M) assigns the 
payoff O to each player in M. 
Suppose therefore that v(M) > 0, and let (x, M) be a p.c. such 
that x i B1(M). Then there exist two players i, j in M such that i has 
a justified objection (y, C) against j. Clearly if x . J O then j could 
form a counter objection (y, (j} ) where y satisfies y .  J o. So assume 
xj > o. Suppose there exists a coalition D e Tji such that 
ex(D) 2 ex(C). By lemma 1, j would have a counter objection to (y, C). 
Consequently e (C) > e (D) for all D e  T . . •  Thus x x J1 
Sij(x) 2 ex(C) > Sji(x) 2 ex(D) and so iQ(x)j. Thus xi K(M). Hence 
K(M) is a subset of B1(M). 
Q.E.D. 
Although the kernel has a number of attractive features, and can be 
fairly readily computed (see Aumann, Peleg and Rabinowitz, 1965), it 
can contain counter-intuitive points, as the following example 
illustrates. 
Example 1 
Consider the simple weighted majority voting game 
[ 8 :  1 2 3 4 5 : ] l, 1, 2, 3, 3, 
where v(M) = 1 for each coalition M with w(M) l 8. Let coalition 
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M = {1, 3, 6} ,  and consider x e V(M). Player 1 may object to {3, 6} and 
form a winning coalition {1, 2, 4,5} . Consequently 
ex({l, 2, 4, 5} ) = 1 - x1 = s13 = s16• In the same way player 3 may 
object to {1, 6} forming {3, 4, 5} so ex({3, 4, 5} ) = 1 - x3 = s31 = s36, 
while player 6 may object to {1, 3} forming (5, 6} , so 
ex((5, 6} ) = 1 - x6 = s61 = s63• In other words each of the three 
players {l} , {3} , {6} pivots in the sense of being able to form a 
winning coalition with players outside M. As a result the requirement 
that s13 = s31 implies that x1 = x3, while s16 = s61 implies that 
x1 = x6• Thus for x e K1({1, 3, 6} )  it is necessary that 
x1 = x3 = x6 = 1/3. 
More generally it can be shown in a simple weighted majority 
voting game if two players i, j in a coalition M have weights w(i), 
w(j) such that w(i) l w(j), then if x e K-(M) it is necessary that 
xi l xj (see Schofield, 1982). However, as the example above shows, 
it is not necessarily that case that w(i) > w(j) implies that xi > xj. 
In fact, Example 1 corresponds to a cabinet coalition situation that 
occurred in Denmark in 1957. In that case cabinet posts were 
distributed to the three parties in the ratio 
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x1 : x3 : x6 = 0.19 : 0.25 : 0. 56. Since this is quite different from 
the kernel prediction, it is reasonable to infer that the kernel does 
not model bargaining capabilities in a very plausible fashion. Some 
empirical justification for this comment can be found in an earlier 
analysis of European coalition government portfolio distributions 
(Schofield, 1976). 
In a simple q-majority game, it is easy to show that for a 
winning coalition M, x e K(M) iff x. = x .  for each pair i, j in M. 1 J 
However, in such a game the bargaining set B1(M) may contain highly 
inequitable and counter-intuitive payoffs, as the following example 
illustrates. 
Example 2 
Let v be the simple majority game with twenty-five players and 
q = 13. Suppose each winning coalition has value 1. 
Let x = (1/7, • • •  , 1/7. 0 • • •  0) 
be a payoff vector associated with the coalition M = {1, • • •  , 13} which 
pays 1/7 to the first seven members of M, and 0 to the remaining six. 
Suppose player 8 objects to player 1 with coalition C = {8, • • •  , 20} , 
paying each of these 1/13. For 1 to counter object he needs seven 
members of C, and may pay them 7/13 altogether, leaving 6/13 > 1/7 for 
himself. Indeed it is easy to show that any objection by a player in 
{8, • • •  , 13} to a player in {1, ••• , 7 } has a counter. Consequently the 
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vector x is B1-stable. However, the vector x is not B2-stable. To 
see this let player 8 object to the group J = {1, • • •  , 7} ,  giving each 
player outside J the payoff 1/18. Clearly J has no counter objection. 
More generally, B2-stability requires that the payoffs in a 
simple q-majority game are equitable, as the following result 
(Schofield, 1978) indicates. 
Lemma 3 
Let v be a simple q-majority game, M a winning coalition and 
x e V(M). 
(a) Suppose (i) that there exist two individuals i, j in M such that 
(b) 
xi < xj and (ii) there is a group J in M of size at most (n - q) 
such that x(J) = [ xk l .!!...=.....9. keJ q 
then x does not belong to B2(M). 
If xi = Tkf for all i e M, then x e B2(M). 
Although this result shows that B2 is nonempty for each coalition in a 
simple q-majority game, in a general transferable value game, B2(M) 
may be empty for some coalition. For this reason we introduce a 
solution notion B •• which is a subset of B1, and can be shown to be 
nonempty for each coalition. 
First of all we mention a general procedure for constructing 
solution theories. Suppose coalition M and some value v(M) is given. 
Suppose further that for each x e V(M) there is defined a power 
relation R(x), which is a subset of M x M. For each i in M let 
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ER(i) = {x e VCM) : jR(x)i for no j e M} be the i
th equilibrium set. 
Then BR(M) = n ER(i) is the bargaining set in V(M), associated with ie M 
the power relation R. 
Now consider the power relation P(x), of definition 1, 
restricted to M x M. For individual i e M, define 
E1(i) = Ep (i) {x e V(M) jP(x)i for no j e M} . 
Then clearly the bargaining set B1(M) which we defined above is given 
by 
B1(M) n E1(i). ie M 
In precisely the same way the solution sets B2 and K for coalition M 
can be defined from the equilibrium sets associated with the power 
relations P2 and Q respectively. 
Definition 4 
Let v : 2N � lR be a transferable value game. Let M be a 
coalition and i, j be two individuals in M. 
(a) For x e V(M) define jP.(x)i iff the following are both satisfied: 
(i) xi > O 
(ii) for some I e T .. , jP(x)I l.J 
and there is no J e T .. with In J # cp such that iP(x)J (here Jl. 
P(x) is the power relation of definition 1). 
(b) Let E*(i) = closure[EP (i)] where Ep (i) is the i
th equilibrium 
• • 
set {x e V(M) : jP.(x)i for no j e M} . 
(c) Define the B.-bargaining set for M to be B*(M) n E*(i). 
ie M 
The idea behind this definition is that even when j has a 
justified objection against a subgroup I, say, containing i, then i 
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may block this objection if it can find a justified objection against 
some subgroup J which contains j, where J has nonempty intersection 
with I. Note that it is more difficult to make a P-justified 
objection than a P.-justified objection, and so B*(M) is a subset of 
B1CM). We present this more formally. 
Lemma 4: Let v be a transferable value game, and let M be any 
coalition. Then 
B2(M) c B*(M) c B1(M) 
Proof: (i) Suppose first of all that v(M) > O.  
(a) To show B*(M) c B1(M). 
Suppose that for some i, j e M, x e V(M) it is the case that 
jP(x)i, even though not (jP.(x)i). Note first of all that xi > 0, 
otherwise i has a counter objection (y, {i} ), where yi 0. Since i 
must be able to block j's objection, there must exist J e Tji such 
that iP(x)J and {i} n J #CJ?. But this implies i e J, which 
contradicts J e Tji" Hence, for all i, j e M, jP(x)i implies jP.(x)i. 
By definition, the set {x e V(M) 
a consequence, Ep (i) = {x e V(M) 
iP(x)j} is an open set in V(M). As 
jP(x)i for no i e M} is closed. 
Moreover EP (i) c Ep (i), for each i e M. To see this suppose that • 
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x & V(M)\Ep (i). Then there exists some j such that jP(x)i. But by 
the above this implies jP*(x)i. Hence x e V(M)\Ep (x). Since Ep(i) * 
is closed, the closure E*(i) of EP (i) also belongs to Ep (i). But * 
then 
B*(M) n E.(i) c n Ep (i) = Bl(M). i&M ie M 
(b) Suppose now that x e EP (i) for some i e M. By definition there 2 
exists no j e M\{i} and no I c M\{j} such that jP(x)I. Consequently 
for no j e M is it the case that jP*(x)i. Thus x e Ep (i). Clearly * 
EP (i) c E*(i) for each i e M, and so 2 
B2(M) c B*(M). 
(ii) In the case that v(M) = O then clearly any vector x in V(M), 
satisfying xi= O for all i in M, belongs to B2CM), B*(M) and B1(M). 
Thus all three sets are identical. 
Q. E.D. 
The standard proof for the existence of a solution theory BR(x) 
depends on the assumption that, for each x e V(M), the power relation, 
R(x), is "acyclic. " In the next section we shall present the 
existence theorem for B* and B1. First of all we show that P*(x) is 
acyclic. 
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Definition 5 
A relation R c M x M is 
(i) asymmetric iff aRb implies not(bRa) for any a, b e M 
(ii) acyclic iff for any subset {a1, • • •  , at} of M it is the case that 
a1Ra2 Rat implies not(atRa1). 
(iii) cyclic iff R is not acyclic. 
Lemma 5 (a generalization of Davis and Maschler, 1967, theorem 3.1) 
Let v be a transferable value game, and M any coalition. Then for 
each x e V(M) the relations P*(x) c M x M, Q(x) c M x M and 
P(x) c M x M are all acyclic. 
Proof 
(i) Suppose that P*(x) is cyclic on M x M, for some x e V(M). 
Write R for P*(x) and take M to be {1, 
• • •  
, t, • • •  } such that 
lR 2R • • •  Rt Rl. 
For each pair (r, r + 1) let Cr be the coalition that maximizes 
the excess e(C) where C contains r but not (r + 1). Let Cs be the 
coalition that maximizes 
e(Cr)' r = l, • • •  , t. 
Consider (s - 1) R s R(s + 1) and suppose that (s - 1) t Cs. 
Let (s - 1) object to M - Cs-l" 
If M - Cs-l belongs to cs then, by Lemma 3 and the fact that 
e(Cs) l �ccs_1l, player s has a counter objection, with Cs, against 
(s - 1). But this means that Cs - 1) does not have a justified 
objection against a subgroup containing s. By contradiction 
M - Cs-l 'F- Cs and so CM - Cs-l) n CM - Cs) F If. 
However, (s - 1) P (M - Cs-l> and sP(M - Cs), which 
contradicts (s - 1) R S. Consequently (s - 1) e Cs• 
By induction 1 e Cs. 
By cyclicity t R 1 and so t e Cs, and by induction again 
(s + 1) e Cs· 
But Cs is the coalition which s uses to form an objection 
against (s + 1). By definition therefore (s + 1) t Cs· By the 
contradiction P.(x) must be acyclic. 
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(ii) The proof for the acyclicity of Q(x) proceeds in the same 
way. For some x e V(M) let Q = Q(x) and assume there is a Q cycle 
lQ 2Q • • •  Qt Ql. Write t + 1=1. For each pair (r,r + 1), for 
r = 1, • • •  ,t, let Cr be the coalition that maximizes the excess 
{e(C) : C e  Tr, r+l}. Let Cs be the coalition that maximizes 
e(Cr) : r = 1, • • •  ,t. Now consider (s - l)Q s Q(s + 1) and suppose 
that (s - 1) t Cs· By definition Cs e Ts, s+l so s e Cs. If 
(s - 1) t Cs then Cs e Ts, s-l" But by the assumption e(Cs) l e(Cs-l> 
where Cs-l is the coalition that maximizes {e(C) : C e Ts-l, s}. But 
we have assumed that (s - l)Qs and so 
e(Cs-l> > e(C) for all Ce Ts, s-l" 
By contradiction (s - 1) e Cs· By the induction procedure, individual 
1 belongs to Cs. Moreover, t Q 1 and 1 e Cs implies that t e Cs. By 
induction again (s + 1) e Cs• By assumption Cs is the coalition that 
maximizes {e(C) : C e Ts, s+ll and so (s + 1) t Cs. By this 
contradiction the cycle lQ 2Q • • •  Qt Q1 may not exist. Thus for all 
x e V(M), the relation Q(x) on M x M is acyclic. 
(iii) Lellima 4 has established, for each i,j e M and any 
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x e V{M) that jP(x)i implies jP.{x)i. Moreover, Lemma 2 shows that if 
jP(x)i then Sji(x) > sij{x) or jQ(x)i. Thus if for some x e V(M), 
P(x) is cyclic, then both P.(x) and Q(x) are cyclic, contradicting the 
first two parts of this lemma. Thus P(x) is acyclic. 
Q.E.D. 
The importance of acyclicity of a power relation R(x) on M x M 
is that there must exist some individual i, say, who is maximal, or at 
the "top of the pecking order, " in the sense that, for no j e M, is it 
the case that jR(x)i. There must also exist an individual, k, at the 
"bottom" i.e., kR(x)j for no j e M. The standard proof of this is by 
induction, using the finiteness of M. A second property that results 
from acyclicity of R(x), for all x, is that the family of equilibrium 
sets {ER(i) : i e M} is a cover for V(M). 
Lemma 6: If for each x e V(M) the relation R(x) is acyclic, then 
U ER(i) iBM 
V(M). 
Proof: Suppose that x e V(M) such that x e ER(i) for no i e M. Then 
for every i e M, there exists some j e M such that jR(x)i. But this 
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violates acyclicity. 
Q.E.D. 
Having established the properties of power relations, we turn, in the 
next section, to the existence theorem for bargaining sets. 
4. AN EXISTENCE THEOREM FOR BARGAINING SETS 
The original proof of nonemptiness of the bargaining set 
B1(M), for each coalition M, relied on a fixed point argument (Peleg, 
1967b, 1969; Billera, 1970) making use of the acyclicity of the 
underlying power relation (Davis and Maschler, 1967). Here we shall 
show existence of the B.-bargaining set by making use of a proof 
procedure developed by Border (1983) which relies on the Knaster-
Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (1929) or KKM Theorem. To present the KKM 
Theorem we let A represent the standard (m - !)-dimensional simplex in 
mm. The ith vertex of A is
. 
ei = (0, • • •  ,1, • • •  ,0) with 1 in the ith 
position. Let M = {1, • • •  ,m}. For any set X = {x1, • • •  ,xj} of points 
in A let con(X) be the convex hull of X. 
KKM Theorem: Let {F1, • • •  ,Fm} be a family of closed subsets of A, 
indexed by M, such that, for each subset A of M, the convex hull, 
con{ei : i e A}, belongs to U F . •  
ieA 1 
compact). 
m 
Then n Fi is nonempty (and i=l 
To make use of this theorem in the context of a proof of the 
equilibrium set BR(M) for a power relation R, we note first that the 
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set V(M) in mn may essentially be identified with the (m - 1) 
dimensional simplex. 
A power relation R we regard as a correspondence 
R : A � M x M, where for each x s A, R(x) is a relation on M, and 
thus a subset of M x M. We shall say that R is acyclic iff, for each 
x e A, R(x) is acyclic. A power relation R is open iff, for each 
i,j e M the set 
Aji = {x e A : jR(x)i} is open in A. 
As before the ith equilibrium set of R is 
ER(i) = {x e A :  jR(x)i for no j e M}. 
Define the equilibrium set of R on M to be 
BR(M) = _n ER(i). i e M 
Note that if R is an open power relation, then 
ER(i) = n (A\A . .  )je M Ji 
is the intersection of closed sets, and therefore closed. 
Now define \ .  = {x e A : x. = OJ. Li 1 
If we consider the power relation P(x) of definition 1, restricted to 
M x M, and regard x as a member of A rather than V(M) then clearly, 
for any vector x e A such that xi = O, it is the case that jP(x)i for 
no j s M. Consequently L i c ER(i). This property is important in 
the proof of existence of the equilibrium set. 
Theorem 1 (Peleg, 1967a; Border, 1983). 
Let R be a power relation on A which is acyclic and open. Suppose 
further that for each i s M, L i c ER (i) • 
nonempty. 
Proof: For each i s M. define 
Then BR(M) = .n ER(i) is isM 
FR(i) = {x s A :  iR(x)j for no j s M}. 
Pick any subset A of M, and let x s con{ei : i s A}. Since A is a 
finite set, and R(x) is an acyclic relation on A, there exists some 
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integer k s A, such that kR(x)j for no j s A. Moreover, suppose i � A. 
Since x s con{ej : j s A}, it is the case that x. = O and so x s \ . i Li 
or x s ER(i). But then jR(x)i for no j s M. In particular kR(x)i for 
no i & M\A. Thus x s FR(k). But k s  A and so 
con(ei : i s  A} c U FR(i). isA 
Moreover for each k s M, 
FR(k) = .n (A\Akj) JBM 
is the intersection of closed sets and therefore closed. 
By the KKM Theorem, n FR(k) f. <p. 
ksM 
But BR(M) = n ER(i) = n n (A\Aij) = n FR(k). isM isM jsM ksM 
Thus BR(M) f. <p. 
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Q. E.D. 
Theorem 2 (Billera, 1970). 
Let M = {1, • • •  ,m} and let (Fi : i s M} be a family of closed 
subsets of the simplex A in JR m, such that for each i s M, L i c Fi. 
If U F. =A, then n F. f. <p. 
isM 1 isM 1 
Proof: Define the power relation R as follows: 
For each x s A, iR(x)j iff d(x,Fi) > d(x,Fj) and xj > O. Here 
d : A x A -7 JR is any distance function on A, so for any subset F of 
A, d(x,F) is the distance inf d(x,y), while x = Cx1, • • •  ,xm) is the ysF 
usual coordinate system for JRm. Now the power relation R is open and 
acyclic on A. Moreover, if xi = O then jR(x)i for no j s M. By 
Theorem 1, the set 
BR(M) = {x s A : iR(x)j for no i,j s M} 
is nonempty. Consider x s BR(M). By assumption, if xi = 0 then 
x s Fi. Moreover for any j,k such that xj f. O, xk f. O it must be the 
case that d(x,Fj) = d(x,Fk). 
But U Fi =A, and so, for some k s M, d(x,Fk) = O. Since each set isM 
Fi is closed, x s Fi' for each i e M. Thus n Fi f. <p. isM 
Q. E.D. 
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Theorem 3 
Let v be a transferable value game, and M any coalition. Then 
B*(M), B1(M) and K(M) are nonempty. 
Proof: (i) If v(M) 0 then, as in the proof of lemma 4, x e B*(M) 
iff xi = O for each i e M. 
Assume therefore that v(M) f O. In this case the set V(M) of 
payoffs is isomorphic to the (m - !)-dimensional simplex A under the 
transformation: 
1\ V(M) -7 A Cx1, • • •  , xn) -7 v(�) (xi : i e M). 
We may therefore identify V(M) with A. By lemma 5, the relation P*(x) 
is acyclic on M x M, for each x e A. By lemma 6, U EP (i) = A. But eeM * 
each E*(i) is the closure of Ep (i), and so * 
U E•(i) =A. 
ieM 
By definition 4, if x e A such that xi = O then jP.(x)i for no j e M. 
Thus L i c E•(i). Thus the family {E.(i) : I e M} satisfies the 
conditions of Theorem 2, and so 
B•(M) n E•(i) is nonempty. 
ieM 
(ii) The proof for the kernel proceeds in the same way. From 
the definitions, the set Aji = {x e A : jQ(x)i}, for i, j e M}, is an 
open set in A. To see this note that x e A .. iff S .. (x) > S .. (x) and J1 J1 1J 
xi > O. But if 
ex(C) = v(C) - x(C) 
> ex(D) = v(D) - x(D) 
for some C e  T . .  and all D e  T .. , then there exists a neighborhood U J1 1J 
of x in A such that S .. (x') > S .. (x') for all x' e U. Therefore the J1 1J 
ith equilibrium set 
EQ. (i) 
Moreover, if xi 
n (A\A.i) is closed. jeM J 
O then jQ.(x)i for no j e M. Thus L i c EQ(i). 
Again Theorem 2 shows that 
BO. (M) n EQ(i) is nonempty ieM 
24 
Since x e BQ.(M) iff iQ.(x)j for no i, j e M clearly Bo.CM) = K(M) and so 
the kernel of M is nonempty. 
(iii) Since B•(M) c B1(M) and K(M) c B1(M), proof that B•(M) 
or K(M) is nonempty immediately gives that B1(M) is nonempty. 
The result for B1(M) was obtained by Peleg (1967b), using 
acyclicity of the power relation P, together with a fixed point 
argument. The proof of Theorem 1 based on the KKM Theorem which has 
been presented here is due to Border. 
Since the KKM Theorem can be extended (Fan, 1961) to the case 
where the underlying space is a general compact convex set, the proof 
procedure presented here can be extended to games without side 
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payments (see Peleg, 1969; and Billera, 1970). Indeed the KKM-Fan 
theorem can be further extended (Schofield, 1984) to give a local 
result requiring no convexity assumptions. Moreover, Chichilinsky 
(1981) has recently obtained a purely topological extension of the KKM 
Theorem. Suppose that JF = {F1, • • •  , Fm} is a family of (contractible) 
subsets of Rm with the following properties: (i) if a subfamily has 
nonempty intersection then it is contractible; (ii) the union of any 
subfamily with at most (m + 1) members is contractible. Then JF 
itself has a nonempty intersection if and only if the union of the 
family is contractible. 
These extensions suggest that bargaining notions may be 
developed for spatial games that rely on the contractibility of the 
characteristic sets, rather than on their convexity properties. 
S. A FINAL EXAMPLE 
To illustrate the differences between the equilibrium sets 
B2CM), B.(M) and B1(M), consider example 1 again: 
[ 8: 1 3 1 2 6 s 2 1 4 s l 3 3 j 
First of all we compute B2({1, 3, 6}), supposing for convenience that 
v(M) = 1 for each winning coalition. Consider x e V(M) such that 
x6 < 1/2. {6} may object to {1, 3} forming (y, {4, S, 6}) with y6 = 1/2, 
Y4 + Ys = 1/2. {1, 3} need both {4, S} to counter object. Since 
x1 + x3 > 1/2, there is no counter. Thus x e B2({1, 3, 6}) implies 
x6 2. 1/2. In the same way if x2 < 1/3, then {3} objects to {1, 6} 
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forming (y, {3, 4, S}) with y3 = y4 = y5 = 1/3. But {1, 6} need either 
{4} or {SJ. Since x1 + x6 > 2/3 it is impossible for them to counter 
object with either {4} or {SJ. Thus x e B2({1, 3, 6}) implies x3 2. 1/3. 
Finally if x1 < 1/4, then {1} objects to {3, 6} forming {y, {1, 2, 4, S}} 
with y1 = y2 = y4 = y5 = 1/4. To counter object {3, 6} needs either 
{2}, {4} or {S}. Since x3 + x6 > 3/4 they have no counter objection. 
Thus 
x e B2({1, 3, 6}) implies x6 2. 1/2, x3 2. 1/3, x, 2. 1/4. 
However for x e V(M), x1 + x3 + x6 = 1. Thus B2({1, 3, 6}) = 'fl . To 
compute B*({l, 3, 6}) we proceed as follows. Consider player {6} first 
of all. As we have seen if x6 2. 1/2 then it is not the case that 
{6} P(x) {1, 3}. Suppose, however, that x6 < 1/2. Then {6} P(x) 
{1, 3}. Now {1} may block this objection if it can find a justified 
objection against {3, 6}, and this it may do if x1 < 1/4. In the same 
way {3} may block this objection if it can find a justified objection 
against {1,6}, and again this is possible if x3 < 1/3. Thus 
Fp (6) • 
{x e /J. 6P.(x)j for no j = 1, 3} 
{x e /J. : x6 2. 1/21 U 
{x e /J. : x6 < 1/2, x3 < 1/3, x1 < 1/4}. 
It should be clear that B*({l, 3, 6}) = F*(l) n F*(3) n F*(6) where 
F*(i) is the closure of Fp (i) in V(M). Thus • 
B* ( {1.3, 6}) {x e /J.: x1 i 1/4, x3 i 1/3, x6 i 1/2}. 
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As mentioned in Example l, the "actual" payoff was 
y = (0.19, 0. 25, 0. 56). 
The square error of y from B* is e = . 085 . As noted in Example 1, the 
kernel for this coalition allocates 1/3 each to 1,3 and 6. The square 
error of the kernel is 0. 26. Clearly the B* prediction is superior to 
the kernel prediction in this example. More generally a recent 
empirical analysis (Schofield and Laver, 1983) of portfolio 
distribution in European government cabinets has found that the 
predictions made by B2 (when it exists), or B* otherwise, are superior 
to those of the kernel or the proportional payoffs (suggested by 
Gamson, 1961) in a significant number of cases. 
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